Russia-Ukraine War Special Report - 10 JAN 2024 - RIP Russian Fall/Winter Offensive

We've been noting in the Situation Reports for almost two weeks that something is amiss with the Russian offensive, and after a lot of analysis, all signs point to the end of the 2023 Russian fall/winter offensive. The operation started on October 6, with shaping operations beginning earlier, and ended on January 1. The Russian fall/winter offensive lasted about as long as the 2023 Ukrainian summer offensive. 

The number and intensity of Russian attacks have declined significantly. While fighting continues along the entire line of conflict, The number of discrete attacks is down about 50%. Additionally, with the exception of the Kupyansk and Kherson AO, most of the attacks involve large numbers of light infantry with minimal armor support. In Kherson, the most recent attacks in Krynky have been mostly armor with insufficent light infantry support. An operational pause or poor weather can no longer explain this pattern entering its third week. Additionally, the amount of reinforcements being moved into the Kupyansk, Svatove, Kreminna, Lysychansk, and Siversk AOs is much smaller than the troop movements observed in early October.

Russia has suffered catastrophic heavy equipment losses, and even factoring the resilience of their military-industrial complex, occurred at an unsustainable rate. From October 1, 2023, to January 2, 2024, the Oryx Database has documented incredible losses.

• 249 Main Battle Tanks - 18 companies
• 29 Medium Duty Tanks (T-64, T-62, T-55, T-54) - 2 companies
• 128 Armored Fighting Vehicles - 13 companies
• 394 Infantry Fighting Vehicles - 28 companies
• 35 Armored Personnel Carriers - 3 companies
• 23 Infantry Mobility Vehicles - 2 companies
• 13 Command, Control, and Communications Vehicles
• 26 Engineering Vehicles (and one stray pontoon bridge) - 2 companies 
• 26 pieces of Towed Artillery - 2 batteries
• 103 Self-Propelled Artillery Guns and Mortars - 7 batteries
• 50 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems - 3 batteries
• 25 Surface-to-Air Missile Systems - 2 batteries
• 6 Radars
• 9 Electronic Warfare complexes
• 7 Winged Aircraft, which does not include aircraft shot down over Russia, airframes lost in training accidents or crashes, or acts of sabotage within Russia
• 28 Helicopters - 2 squadrons
• 3 ships of the Black Sea Fleet

What about Ukraine? What was the ratio of losses while defending against the Russian attacks?

• Main Battle Tanks: 6.38:1 - Ukraine
• Medium Duty Tanks (Leopard 1-A5, MS-55, T-64): 1.07:1 Ukraine
• Armored Fighting Vehicles: 8.00:1 Ukraine
• Infantry Fighting Vehicles: 7.73:1 Ukraine
• Armored Personnel Carriers: 0.83:1 Russia
• Infantry Fighting Vehicles: 0.96:1 Russia
• Command, Control, and Communications Vehicles: 13.00:1 Ukraine
• Engineering Vehicles: 1.44:1 Ukraine
• Towed Artillery: 1.53:1 Ukraine
• Self-Propelled Artillery Guns and Mortars: 2.34:1 Ukraine
• Multiple Launch Rocket Systems: 25.00:1 Ukraine
• Surface-to-Air Missile Systems: 12.50:1 Ukraine
• Radars: 0.75:1 Russia
• Electronic Warfare complexes: 9.00:1 Ukraine
• Winged Aircraft: 1.75:1 Ukraine
• Helicopters: 28.00:0 Ukraine
• Naval Vessels: 3.00:1 Ukraine

Ukraine also lost 24 MRAPs during the same time period, compared to two fielded by Russia. Russia doesn't have many MRAPs in its inventory.

Russian senior officers have reappeared on the line of conflict and are getting killed and wounded. The Russian command structure is top-down, and subordinates are not empowered to improvise on the battlefield. At the squad and platoon level, there isn't a non-commissioned officer corps to instill discipline or modify battle plans. When the Ministry of Defense of Russia eliminated the failed Battalion Tactical Group unit and command structure in the fall of 2022, they strengthened this top-down command structure.

Senior Russian commanders, Lieutenant Colonel and above, are forced to the forwardmost line of friendly troops (FLOT) when orders aren't being followed, battle plans aren't being executed on schedule, or communications have broken down. In the last 30 days, one general was wounded and one killed. In the last week, two colonels have been confirmed killed in action. Senior unit commanders are being directed by Moscow to sort out the floundering offensive, and this consistently happens as Russian offensives culminate. 

Russian ground forces have not been able to turn tactical gains into operational success and are being pushed back in three AOs. This is happening despite Ukraine suffering a significant personnel and ammunition disadvantage. Ukrainian troops have successfully pushed Russian troops back east of Stepove, south and southeast of Novomykhailivka, north of Synkivka, and northeast of Petropavlivka. The only location where Russian forces appear capable of turning recent tactical gains into operational success is west of Marinka, where Russian forces continue to creep toward Herohiivka.

Against all odds, the current Russian offensive at Avdiivka has failed. Russia's operational goals at Avdiivka were not only transparent but leaked by Russian milbloggers in their commentary. We maintain that Russia is "all in" at Avdiivka and will continue to do everything it can to collapse Ukrainian defenses. Despite dedicating up to 60,000 troops and over a thousand pieces of heavy military equipment for the October offensive, the current operation is winding down. The operational goals were, 

• One, expand Russian positions west and north of the Krasnohorivka Plateau to establish the high ground as a firebase to bring Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOC) under fire control. Russian troops did expand their positions north, northwest, west, and south of Krasnohorivka but were unable to establish military control of the settlement. The Russian GLOC from the H-20 Highway to Krasnohorivka remains a road of death, and it is impossible to set up fire bases in Krasnohorivka.
• Two, use the railroad grade to capture Ochertyne to the northwest of Krasnohorivka, push west through Stepove and Berdychi to Semenivka, and take physical control of the Ukrainian GLOC to Novoselivka Persha. Russia had partial success, making tactical gains on the railroad grade toward Novobakhmutivka and entering eastern Stepove several times, but failed to achieve the operational goal. 
• Force Ukrainian troops to withdraw from the Avdiivka Coke Plant stronghold by bringing it under fire control, air strikes, and a sweep and clear operation by light infantry. Russia failed to achieve this goal.
• Capture the high ground west of the industrial district in southeast Avdiivka, bring Ukrainian forces defending along the H-20 Highway west of Kruta Balka and Kshtanove under fire control, and force a withdrawal. Russian forces were drawn into a kill box in the industrial district in southeast Avdiivka, and the offensive stalled out. Ukrainian forces have maintained their defensive positions along the H-20 Highway.
• Maintain subordinate attacks on the southern flank of Avdiivka. Capture Sieverne and bring the Ukrainian GLOCs into Avdiivka under fire control. Force the withdrawal from Tonenke and connect with Russian forces in Semenivka, bringing Avdiivka into complete encirclement. Additionally, keep Ukrainian forces locked in place to support the offensive on the northern flank, which held the main mission objective. This failed.
• Keep the Ukrainian GLOCs into Avdiivka under fire control, strangling their supplies. Not only did this fail, but Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited the forward command center in Avdiivka and recorded a video standing outside only 1,800 meters from the forwardmost line of Russian troops.

There is a key phrase here, "current Russian offensive." Culmination does not mean victory. Culmination does not mean the end of Russian attacks. Russia still has a reserve force of up to 60,000 troops staged in the Avdiivka AO and is capable of launching a new, organized offensive. Currently, Russian commanders are using piecemeal attacks of squads, platoons, and companies of mostly light infantry. Russian losses would be even worse if the Ukrainians weren't facing a crippling ammunition shortage.

Russia can't collapse the Ukrainian bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnipro and Konka Rivers, and it has become a big problem. If I may brag, we nailed this assessment. The longer Russia allowed the bridgeheads to exist, the harder it would become to collapse them until they became a permanent feature. Russian losses have been so high at Krynky, Pidstepne, Pishchanivka, Poima, and south of Dachi that units are being rotated out. The problem of the Ukrainian bridgeheads became so severe that the already combat-destroyed Russian 810th Naval Infantry was rotated into the Kherson AO and is now practically non-existent. Over 150 Russian armored vehicles have been visually confirmed destroyed just by the Birds of Magyar. The Russian GLOCs of the T-2206 Highway and the road from Obryvka to Korsunka are littered with dozens of destroyed Russian vehicles. Not even Russian Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, who has developed a reputation as a fixer on difficult fronts, has been able to come up with a battle plan to push Ukrainian forces back across the river. 

Are Ukrainian forces suffering losses? Yes. Are wet crossings difficult and constantly targeted? Yes. Is the bridgehead littered with the bodies of the uncollected dead? Russian drone operators shared high-resolution pictures of the Antonivskyy Zaliznychnyy Mist Railroad Bridge, which was blown up with the withdrawal of Russian troops in November 2022. The pictures included clear daylight views of the left bank of the Dnipro and the channel to the Konka River. The shoreline and marshes were not littered with wrecked Ukrainian boats, and there weren't piles of uncollected body bags surrounded by blast craters filled with dead Ukrainian soldiers. Is the situation more difficult further south at the Konka River crossing? Almost certainly, yes, but the reports of absolute carnage appear to be exaggerated. 

Could Russia collapse the bridgeheads? Absolutely. They have the personnel and equipment, but it would be a major effort now, and Ukrainian drones, artillery, and, to a lesser extent, air power would cause major Russian casualties. Teplinsky appears content to suffer "acceptable casualties," which by modern standards is still appalling. 

Finally, while the Russian Ministry of Defense continues a policy of not reporting on the situation on the left bank of the Konka and Dnipro Rivers, Russian milbloggers are expressing frustration. Russian troops also continue to complain about the lack of close air and artillery support and don't understand why artillery shells are flying over their heads to target Ukrainian civilians on the right bank - and they're saying it out loud. It's another situation of, "You're so close to figuring it out."

Ukraine changed its tactics, and has dramatically altered the war of attrition. Last winter, Ukrainian defenders were killing and wounding Russian forces at a rate of 3:1 to 5:1, and during a brutal period in February 2023, the ratio dipped to 1:1. During the most recent Russian offensive, the ratio was 7:1 to 13:1, depending on the AO. We have some additional insight that we haven't shared due to operational security.

Russia has gone back to what they always do when an offensive culminates - killing civilians. From December 29 to January 2, Russian missile and drone attacks killed and wounded almost 600 civilians, according to the United Nations. Search and recovery operations from those attacks and a new wave of January 6-7 continue, with the number approaching 700. Hospitals, churches, and shopping malls not only suffered collateral damage, they were intentionally targeted. Yes, Russia is also striking Ukraine's industrial base and military facilities as part of these attacks with questionable results. 

Russia's disinformation and hybrid warfare operatives have gone back to what they always do when an offensive culminates - claim Russia is ready for peace negotiations and Ukraine can't win. If you're reading the broader press, you're seeing a wave of stories in the West that Moscow is signaling they're ready to negotiate a peace deal, and it's Ukraine that is being unreasonable. Ukraine can't restore its borders, and the best outcome for the world would be a Minsk III settlement - land for peace. The old trope of Russia using tactical nuclear weapons, if they believe they'll lose control of Crimea, has also restarted.

Is Russia winning? What are Russia's stated military goals in Ukraine?

• The capture of Novorossiya - a shortlived region that represents all of southern Ukraine, including Crimea and the Black Sea Coast, Moldova, western Ukraine to the Slovakia and Hungary borders, central Ukraine, and northeastern Ukraine, including all of Kharkiv and parts of the Sumy Oblast
• The removal of the Ukrainian government and replaced with a pro-Moscow regime
• The full demilitarization of Ukraine
• Ukraine maintaining its neutral status
• The discovery and exposure of Ukraine's secret nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs
• Blockade Black Sea ports to strangle Ukraine's commerce and control world grain markets
• Prevent NATO expansion to the Russian border

Remember? That was "win," and even that moves the goalposts from February 24, 2022, when Russia's stated goal was the capture of all of Ukraine.

Russia controlled about 7% of Ukraine on February 23, 2022, peaked at about 40% on March 30, 2022, and currently controls 17.9%. Russia does not have complete administrative or military control of Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, or Kherson. As of the 10th, Ukraine has regained more territory in January 2024 than Russia. Finland is a member of NATO, and Sweden is inching closer. President Zelenskyy is still in charge and, while leading an existential crisis for national survival, is implementing massive government reforms. Ukraine is now one of the most air-defense-dense nations on the planet, and the military has gotten stronger since 2022 - not weaker. No nuclear weapons have been uncovered, nor have any secret weapons programs, bio labs, or chemical weapons. Ukraine now has a council of equals with NATO and is on the path to EU membership. More cargo is moving through Ukrainian ports than during the Black Sea Grain Initiative. 

How can any of this be defined as Russia winning? 

What are Ukraine's stated goals?

• Survive as a nation
• Stop further Russian advances
• Liberate occupied territories, including Crimea

When you're fighting a war of survival, your goals are simpler. Ukraine is not only surviving as a nation, GDP is growing and 50 kilometers beyond the front lines, life has become normalized in a World War II, the London Blitz sort of way. Russia has not had any operational success in capturing new territory since June 1. In all of 2023, Russia captured 1/3317 of Ukrainian territory - 182 square kilometers. 

Did the Ukrainian summer offensive fail?

For the most part - yes. The strategic victory was in the Black Sea. We have previously covered this.

Wait, are you saying Ukraine is winning?

No. Ukraine has major problems, but when you look through the lens of stated military objectives, yes, Ukraine is "winning," but it needs support to achieve its strategic goals of stopping further Russian advances and liberating its territory.

What problems does Ukraine have?

The late summer purge of the Ukrainian commissariat and medical board leadership, along with numerous arrests for corruption, was absolutely necessary and executed poorly. These issues should have been addressed in 2022 and in our assessment even earlier. The change in leadership caused mobilization and recruitment to collapse. The personnel shortage Ukraine is facing is not due to a lack of available men but because the military induction system itself remains broken. The worst documented problems were in Lviv and Odesa, and these continue to be major trouble spots within the commissariat system.

Ukraine is still sending undertrained troops to the frontlines. This practice has to stop. While Ukrainian military leadership has done an excellent job of improving the attritional warfare math, and in November and December, likely killed and wounded more Russian soldiers than Moscow can replace, there continue to be reports of soldiers arriving at the FLOT with 2 to 3 weeks of training. This destroys morale, hurts military recruitment, and wastes the most valuable resource any military has - grunts with guns. Grunts with guns take territory. Grunts with guns hold territory. It is self-defeating to rush troops to the front while you're simultaneously dealing with a shortage due to military induction issues.

Ukraine is incapable of matching the combined war production of Russia, Iran, and North Korea on its own, and some of its allies clearly don't understand that - or they do and don't care. Independently, Russia can produce about two million artillery rounds a year. Over the summer, before purchasing ammunition from North Korea, the number of artillery shells (122 and 152 mm) fired by Russia a day dropped to around 5,000. There were surges as high as 20,000 a day, but these were outliers. This aligns with reports that Russia has used up most of its Cold War inventory. Supplemented by North Korea, Russia is now firing 10,000 rounds a day. Ukraine has gone from a summertime peak of 7,000 to 2,000 (105, 122, 152 and 155 mm).

Could Ukraine produce one million artillery rounds a year? With outside financial help and underground production, yes. It would be a lot easier if Europe and North America increased their production and continued to support Ukraine while financing the development of internal ammunition production.

The Ukrainian military continues to struggle with executing combined arms warfare at the battalion and brigade levels. There have been flashes of brilliance, and Ukraine is learning. The Ukrainian 47th Brigade in Avdiivka has been masterful after a disastrous start in Zaporizhzhia in June 2023. Ukrainian forces were also highly effective during their advance from Velyka Novosilka. There have also been a number of videos showing excellent execution at a company level. However, Ukraine will not liberate large areas of territory until they better coordinate their military resources at a brigade level.

Can Russia win as they define win?

Yes. Absolutely. Within Russia, the Russia-Ukraine War is being portrayed as a war of sacrifice and survival. Kremlin propagandists connect the struggles of World War II to the current conflict. The strength of that propaganda, the ongoing political purge, and the silencing of dissident voices have enabled Russia to fight like it's 1943. Very few people believed that this was possible in the 21st century, including our team. The Kremlin is buffering its losses by using forced mobilization in the occupied territories, private military companies, convicts, debtors, dissidents, foreigners, and contract soldiers. Contract numbers are being maintained with promises of salaries as high as $2,200 a month - which typically go unpaid, but the promise is enough.  

Can Ukraine win as they define win?

Yes. Absolutely, but Ukraine has a harder path than Russia. Without additional Western support and a significant increase in war production, Ukraine will never achieve its goals. They also won't achieve their goals, being forced to fight an attritional battle of artillery duels and grunts with guns engaged in combat for each tactically significant rock and tree stump. Ukraine can win if equipped with the right weapons, which will enable the adoption of Western combined arms tactics and sufficient engineering and breaching equipment to punch several holes through the Surovikin Line, confusing Russian commanders on where to deploy reserve forces.

Wait, if Russia is losing, how are they a threat to the rest of Europe?

Russia does not care about military losses. That is very clear. If the West permits Russia to capture Ukraine, they will control Ukraine's natural resources, inherit Ukraine's military hardware and war production, and, even with a refugee crisis, capture at least 30 million civilians. Likely more because faced with panicked Ukrainians seeking to flee into Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland, it is very likely all those countries will close their borders. Europe can't absorb 10 or 15 million refugees, and it can be easily justified in the name of "national security."

Russia's air defense capabilities would now extend into most of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, all of Moldova, most of Romania and even parts of Bulgaria. What is NATO warfare doctrine?  Heavy use of air power to overwhelm communications, command and control, and logistics. 

With Transnistria now connected with the Russian sphere, its absorption is likely to be almost instant. Moldova isn't part of NATO, has only a ceremonial military, and isn't part of the EU. Logically, that's the next country to be absorbed where Moscow does not have to worry about a NATO response.

Further, the current administrations in Hungary and Slovakia would likely welcome their new Russian neighbors. Even if Russia were to attack a NATO nation, an Article V declaration leaves the decision on how to respond in the hands of each member of the Alliance. A 31-nation response is not guaranteed and is very unlikely.

In this scenario, Russia would now have 30 million Ukrainians and 2 million Moldovans, who, while they hate Russia, are now under their strict control and hold a deep sense of betrayal directed toward the West. Faced with joining the Russian military or having no job, it will be easy to recruit hundreds of thousands of people into the Russian ranks. We see that today. While Russia won't be able to use M777 howitzers or M142 GMLRS, they'll have plenty of other weapons at their disposal. Worse, they'll have access to how Ukraine modified NATO munitions into Soviet and post-Soviet weapon systems, enabling reverse engineering. Finally, Russia would have the largest FPV one-way drone manufacturing capability on the planet, along with the best operators.

Yes, but NATO doesn't fight using human wave attacks and artillery. They destroy advancing Russian forces with ease due to superior tactics, weapon systems, and firepower.

That is very true, but the West doesn't have the production infrastructure to replace cruise missiles, air defense missiles, aircraft, artillery systems, barrels, and armored vehicle losses in an extended land war against Russia, supported by Iran and North Korea. Further, that viewpoint refuses to acknowledge the main issue - Russia does not care about losses and will gladly sacrifice hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians and Moldovans in future European campaigns.

While the current Russian offensive has culminated, the war will continue, and Ukraine should be receiving more support, not less, as it continues to hold the line separating a regional conflict from a continental one.